The Korean Campaign

[Tornadoes28]

Sorry if someone already posted this somewhere. I thought it was interesting to share. Below is Kenneth Swope's review on Amazon.com of Hawley's Imjin War. He gave it 2 out of 5 stars and said it is not an authoritative study.

[heron]

We discussed this at some length at the end of 2007. Do you have access to the Kyoshitsu? You can read it all there.
http://forums.samurai-archives.com/viewtopic.php?t=2714&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=25
And Obenjo Kusanosuke posted a blog on it which is in the shogun-ki archives January 2008

[Tornadoes28]

[Tornadoes28]

I understand how Wikipedia is viewed here by some members but I wanted to bring up something I read in the article on the Imjin War. I wanted to get a quick overview of the conflict so I went to Wikipedia since it had a fair amount of information.

Under the section Negotiations and truce between China and Japan (1594–1596), it states the following:

The Ming ambassador met Hideyoshi in October 1596. When Hideyoshi met the Ming ambassador, Hideyoshi wore Ming Dynasty costume and kowtowed (kneel 5 times on the ground and hit his head 3 times on the ground) to Chinese envoy, to show his vassal status to the Chinese Ming Dynasty.

The source for this statement is this which I cannot read:

^ 朝鮮王朝實錄 宣祖 83卷, 29年( 1596 丙申 / 萬曆 24年) 12月 7日] 倭將行長, 馳報秀吉, 擇於九月初二日, 奉迎冊命於大坂〔大阪〕地方受封。 職等初一日, 持節前往, 是日卽抵大坂〔大阪〕。 次日領受欽賜圭印、官服, 旋卽佩執頂被, 望闕行五拜三叩頭禮, 承奉誥命

I do not recall reading previously that Hideyoshi ever "kowtowed" to the Ming emperor to show his vassal status. Maybe I missed it. What is the opinion of this statement? Is it generally accepted?
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[Tatsunoshi]

Abso-froggin-lutely not. In fact, the opposite happened-Hideyoshi wouldn't bow to the edict from the Wanli emperor as he was expected to by the Ming envoys. Hideyoshi was insulted that the envoys wouldn't bow to him. They were given an excuse for this, but the next day when Hideyoshi found out what the edict said (short version, the edict was full of insults and the Ming were declaring him a vassal of the Wanli emperor) he went nuts-ripped his Chinese robes off that had been sent as gifts and at one point threatened to kill the envoys. Hideyoshi was not about to consider himself ANYONE'S vassal at that point of his life-he had been told (lied to) the document would be handing over the government of China to him. No bowing involved-that looks like it was straight from a Chinese or Korean nationalist. Wikipedia, once again, is full of crap.

While my Chinese isn't very good, it looks like that passage actually states that they conducted the investiture ceremony where Hideyoshi was expected to perform the 'kowtow' ritual, but doesn't say that he did. That, of course, was the ceremony where he went nuts in the middle of it.

[Tornadoes28]

[Tatsunoshi]

[Tatsunoshi]

As a follow up, Ayame says the Chinese report actually indiciates that it was the CHINESE ENVOYS, not Hideyoshi, that kowtowed (presumably to the document, not Hideyoshi).

I happen to have Swope's book with me and he states the same thing, using a Chinese source.

Jon, if you have a Wiki account you should change this.

[Tornadoes28]

I already deleted that statement. But I did not replace it with any other information. For the note for my edit, I stated that it was incorrect information not supported by other sources. But how long before it gets changed back again.

Jon
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[kitsuno]

Why change it? As far as Shittypedia goes, the less reliable and more horrible, the better.
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[jim]

Hello, I'm new here, thanks for this great forum.

I've been reading Stephen Turnbull's book on the invasions of Korea, and he mentions the notion of the "ichiban nori" several times as a factor in different battles.

He explains how important it was for a samurai to be first into battle, that sometimes samurai would compete with each other so that they could be first into enemy lines and be called "ichiban nori".

I'm a novice at Japanese history, so I don't know; was the notion of "ichiban nori" that important to the samurai at that time?

And if that's the case, could that have been a possible reason for Hideyoshi to shut out his potential rivals from the Korean invasion, so that he and his supporters could claim all the glory for themselves?

[Obenjo Kusanosuke]

Hi Jim,

Welcome to the SA!

Turnbull is absolutely right about the importance of ichiban nori. Doing something that stands out, or shows extreme courage or audacity, was usually the best way to assure glory and rewards from one's liege lord. This helps to explain in part why such a fierce rivalry developed between Konishi Yukinaga and Katō Kiyomasa as they raced up the Korean peninsula to be the first into Seoul.

However this being said, we must consider that Ieyasu, who was clearly the biggest threat to the Toyotomi hold on power, was by the time of the Korean invasions, above the need to get wrapped up in "ichiban nori" competitions. He was the second most powerful lord in the land. What did he have to prove to Hideyoshi? Absolutely nothing. He already was so big, he had nothing else to prove and very little to gain, but a lot to risk.

And the thought of a tier-two level daimyo pulling together enough troops and material needed to become a threat to Toyotomi rule, was highly unlikely--not without the support of Ieyasu or Maeda Toshiie. Therefore, it was best for those daimyo who did cross the sea to fight, to try to earn as many rewards and glory as possible. It would be the only way for further upward mobility. Hope this helps.
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[jim]

Thanks for the clarification.

That stills begs the question of Hideyoshi, though. Did he have something to prove?

I understand that this is all speculation, but he did come from humble beginnings. I understand he did try to polish his peasant background with mythology, saying that his mother had a divine vision before he was born (is that true? I can't remember where I read that).

And when he was under Nobunaga, didn't he suffer public indignities? Like being called a monkey and what not. Is it possible that Toyotomi Hideyoshi was the one who needed to be proclaimed "ichiban nori"?

[Obenjo Kusanosuke]

For Hideyoshi, the heavens were no limit. He dreamt big and it was always a means of giving himself issue more face "face" and legitimization of his rule and line. Everything had to be opulent, overdone, bigger and better, to display his wealth and prestige. He had hoped to conquer China and present it to the Japanese emperor- placing him on the throne in Beijing, allowing a Toyotomi family member to essentially rule Japan. Presenting China to the emperor would have brought Hideyoshi even higher court titles and ranks (they probably would have had to invent new ones) and more glory. But Jim, it's best not to speculate on these things and keep your feet on terra firma when trying to understand what motivated Hideyoshi to invade Korea. Nobody really knows, and he was absolutely corrupted by his absolute power. One might say, he lost a few marbles.
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[jim]

hehehe- duly noted.

[Juggernaut]

I read a lot about Ming army's generally dismal performance during the war against the Japanese, and I'm interested in what caused that. Does anybody know a good online source or book about Ming army's tactics and organization during the Imjin war, either in English or Japanese?

[Obenjo Kusanosuke]

Check out Kenneth Swope's new book, A Dragon's Head and a Serpent's Tail. It was released the other week and is available on amazon.com. The book takes on the subject of the Japanese invasion of Korea focusing on the Ming's contribution. But please note that the author believes that it was because of the Ming's contribution that the Japanese were defeated. A belief that me and others just don't buy. Even so, I'm really looking forward to reading my copy.

If you also do a google search on the internet of the author's name and "pdf" you may also be able to find some of his previous articles and papers on the subject.
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[Shisendo]

I’ve been meaning to contribute some observations to this thread, but refrained from commenting until I had the opportunity to consult my limited library. The question I know the least about concerns the amount of intelligence that Hideyoshi possessed prior to the invasion. The only thought I can offer is pure speculation: the Ming Dynasty was in decline (ending in 1644), so rumours of its vulnerability had likely reached Japan. Sorry I can't be of more help on that one.

The second question that has been raised regards Hideyoshi’s actual motives for the invasion. As has been mentioned on this thread, this is another issue that invites speculation because there does not appear to be any specific proof in the historical record to support one theory over another. The theory of daimyo depletion seems unconvincing to me, because Hideyoshi had other levers at his disposal, such as lavish building projects, to serve that end. Beginning in the 1580s, daimyo were enlisted to build Osaka Castle and Jurakudai. Then, from 1592-1594, coincidental to the first Korean invasion, Ieyasu helped build Fushimi Castle.

Hubris seems to offer a better explanation due to Hideyoshi's decision to send his most loyal allies and leave his former rivals in Japan. This action is consistent with those of a general who fully expected to achieve victory and share the spoils exclusively with his inner circle. That said, the explanation of hubris alone obscures the political goals Hideyoshi could have attained had the invasion been successful. First of all, an international war offered him an opportunity to unite the country behind his leadership against a common enemy. Second, as a man without the right lineage, he was limited in the ranks he could receive from the Imperial Court. Knowing that he could never become Shogun, and attuned to the reality that accepting court titles undermined his own bid for political supremacy, becoming the new Emperor of China (however farfetched that may sound), would have neatly resolved this domestic concern.

The third question is why Hideyoshi allowed Ieyasu to remain in Japan without risking his own men in battle. Knowing in retrospect that Ieyasu eliminated the Toyotomi family, it can be easy to forget that Hideyoshi gave no outward indication of mistrusting Ieyasu, nor did he see Tokugawa as anything other then a good lieutenant. George Sansom says as much in Volume 2 of A History of Japan, and Ieyasu’s presence on the Council of Regents is perhaps the best proof of all. A.L. Sadler relates an interesting anecdote about a party Hideyoshi held at Nagoya in Hizen, in which he dressed up as a melon seller, Maeda Toshie was a mendicant monk, and Ieyasu was a reed seller. It reveals how far Ieyasu was willing to indulge Hideyoshi’s whims, and helps explain why Hideyoshi believed he had the major daimyo firmly under his control.

Regarding the most recent question of whether or not Hideyoshi had something to prove based on his peasant origins, his mother’s “divine vision" at his birth was mentioned. I would refer you to page 41 of Herman Ooms article “Neo-Confucianism and the Formation of Early Tokugawa Culture: Contours of a Problem” in Peter Nosco’s Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture. In it he notes that Hideyoshi encouraged stories like this, repeating a strategy attempted by Nobunaga to create a religio-political cult with him at the centre for the purpose of consolidating his power in a manner that delegitimized militaristic challenges. As for his low birth, such instances as the garden party in which he exercized his power to have major daimyo assume the roles of peasants, and his great tea party in Kyoto (1587) testify to his populist inclinations. His ostentatious tastes, be it a gold tea room or the boulder-filled garden at Daigoji, are also consistent with the behaviour of what aristocrats the world over dismiss as the antics of the nouveau riche. While his actions might suggest that he had "something to prove" domestically, I have more difficulty seeing how it affected his decision to invade Korea or leave Ieyasu behind in Japan. It seems like too much of a stretch to suggest that he had an inferiority complex that found an analogy in Japan's own anxiety at having been culturally influenced by the mainland. That's an argument best left to someone like Takeo Doi to formulate.
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[Tatsunoshi]

[Shisendo]

[Tatsunoshi]

[Obenjo Kusanosuke]

Regarding Hideyoshi installing the Japanese emperor on the throne in Beijing, you may want to seewhat I wrote above Shisendo's entry into this thread. And I will make our Imjin discussion threads public later tonight or tomorrow.
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[Juggernaut]